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This paper investigates civility from an Aristotelian perspective and has two objectives. 
The first is to offer a novel account of this virtue based on Aristotle’s remarks about civic 
friendship. The proposed account distinguishes two main components of civility—civic 
benevolence and civil deliberation—and shows how Aristotle’s insights can speak to the 
needs of our communities today. The notion of civil deliberation is then unpacked into 
three main dimensions: motivational, inquiry-related, and ethical. The second objective 
is to illustrate how the post-truth condition—in particular, the spread of misinformation 
typical of the digital environments we inhabit—obstructs our capacity to cultivate the 
virtue of civility by impairing every component of civil deliberation. The paper’s overall 
ambition is to direct virtue theorists’ attention to the need to foster civic virtues as a 
means of counteracting the negative aspects of the post-truth age. 
 
 
The most recent wave of virtue-theoretic research has brought attention to a 
range of new—or, at least, underexplored—issues about human character. To 
name just a few, a lot has been said about putting theoretical conceptions of 
character on psychologically robust foundations, investigating moral and 
epistemic vices, and the specific role that virtues such as humility, trust, honesty, 
and courage can play today. Nonetheless, it is only in the past few years that 
virtue theorists have started to reconsider the importance of civic aspects of our 
character. This is a timely concern—one that relates to deeply problematic 
aspects of our conduct qua members of our communities—in a couple respects. 
Several recent political events reveal nationalistic and antidemocratic turns in 
various countries. And for the tenth year in a row, citizens of the digital world 
have experienced a deterioration of their rights, most recently accelerated by the 
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COVID-19 pandemic (Shahbaz and Funk 2020) and infodemic, as the World 
Health Organization warned us at the beginning of 2020.1 
 Thus, today, more than ever, it seems appropriate for virtue theorists to 
ask whether there is anything we can do to improve the welfare of our 
communities, which is threatened by—among other things—a significant 
deterioration of the quality of interactions among citizens. This paper has two 
main goals: namely, raising awareness of the civic traits of our character qua 
citizens of the digital world and illustrating how the current problems affecting 
democratic societies have seriously damaged our capacity to take part in the life 
of our communities and deliberate with other citizens. 
 We shall pursue these goals in the two main sections. In section 1, we 
outline a novel account of civility grounded in Aristotle’s remarks about civic 
friendship and its components. After a brief overview of the current debate 
about civic virtues in the Aristotelian tradition (§1.1), we reconstruct Aristotle’s 
take on civic friendship (§1.2) and show how we can derive a theory of civility 
that can speak to the needs of our societies while staying true to the original 
spirit of Aristotle’s conception (§1.3). 2 According to our account, civility 
consists of two main components, one epistemic (civil deliberation) and one 
moral (civic benevolence). In §1.4, we offer an in-depth analysis of civil 
deliberation, which we consider to be particularly at risk of being impaired by 
the peculiar problems we are exposed to qua citizens in the post-truth age. 
Section 2 pursues the goal of showing how the post-truth condition—in 
particular, the spread of misinformation typical of the digital environments we 
inhabit—degrades our capacity to cultivate the virtue of civility by impairing our 
capacity for civil deliberation. Our hope is that a comprehensive understanding 
of the various factors threatening the possibility to develop civil attitudes will 
serve as a first and fundamental building block of a larger project for virtue 
theorists: that of helping citizens navigate the digital oceans of a post-truth age 





1 See https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/munich-security-conference. 
2  It is important to note that in what follows we do not mean to adjudicate between rival 
interpretations of Aristotle, nor to assess them on philological grounds; rather, we attempt to draw 
insights from the Aristotelian texts in order to rebuild a neo-Aristotelian account of civility and 
civic virtue. 
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1. Civility: An Aristotelian Account 
1.1 Some Background Considerations 
 
Civic virtue, under the name of civility, has been the object of several 
investigations in ethics and political theory mostly outside the Aristotelian 
tradition—more specifically, within the republican tradition and in the context of 
liberal theories of democracy. The latter define civility as “a bond uniting honest 
men busy minding their own affairs” who are neighborly but who recognize that 
“good fences do make good neighbors” (Orwin 1991, 560). In a pluralistic 
society, that is, civility is closely related to tolerance, to the extent that it is 
equated to “respectful dialogue-keeping a civil tongue” (Calhoun 2000, 256). 
Other democratic theorists conceive of civic virtues such as political prudence 
as features of statesmen (Ottonelli 2018).3 
Nonetheless, various concerns have recently been raised about the 
notion of civility. Cheshire Calhoun, in a seminal paper, identifies at least three 
reasons for a suspicion of civility as a civic virtue: (i) its intimate association with 
good manners; (ii) its apparent closeness to law abidance, or even conformism 
to established rules, as opposed to the adoption of a socially critical moral point 
of view; (iii) its naming of a specific virtue, rather than being an attitude 
underlying a collection of virtues such as tolerance or law abidance (Calhoun 
2000, 251–55). The relevance and variety of skeptical concerns raised by 
Calhoun illustrate that rebuilding the concept of civility upon new and stronger 
foundations is both an urgent and an effortful task. 
Within the neo-Aristotelian field, things are equally complicated. For 
Aristotle, given the political nature of human beings, leading a good life as a 
citizen of the polis is a chief—or even the main—educational goal. Suffice it to 
recall that the highest form of phronesis is the political and that the only real-life 
example of a phronimos he offers is that of the most famous political leader of 
his time, Pericles. However, compared to this discussion, Aristotle’s treatment 
of specifically political or civic virtues is surprisingly modest. As is well known, 
most of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to listing and discussing 
ethical and dianoetical, or intellectual, virtues; the treatise on justice in book V 
has no markedly political flavor; book VI, in which Aristotle develops his 
 
3  See also Walzer (1974); Zwiebach (1975); Orwin (1991); Kingwell (1995); Rawls (1971, 
1993); Sinopoli (1995). For a brief yet extremely informative reconstruction of the history of the 
concept, see Angle (1975). 
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account of phronesis alongside the other intellectual virtues, contains no 
specific discussion of political phronesis; and there is no civic virtue as such 
among the ethical virtues of books II–IV, but only a group of more generically 
social virtues (NE II, 1108b 9–1108 b10; IV, 1126b 10–1128b 9) whose 
relevance has long been overlooked. As we suggest in §§1.3-1.4, there is ample 
room for revising this picture, and the most interesting places to look at are 
precisely some of the social virtues mentioned and the notion of civic friendship 
that emerges both in Politics and in Nicomachean Ethics. However, given the 
general picture that emerges from mainstream readings of Nicomachean Ethics, 
it is not too surprising that neo-Aristotelians have long neglected to elaborate 
an Aristotelian account of civic virtue. 
Recently, though, neo-Aristotelians have started to reconsider the 
issue, especially in light of the increasing threats to our democracies. It is 
striking to notice the difference in tone within the span of just two decades. It 
was as recent as 1998 that Robert Audi claimed that “civic virtue seems less 
basic than certain other broadly moral traits; it is, for example, constituted 
largely by fairness, veracity, loyalty, and a measure of benevolence toward fellow 
citizens” (152). One decade later, several important voices started to reconceive 
civic virtue in more positive terms. Jason Baehr (2011, 2015) has attempted to 
give civic virtues the prominence they deserve as a distinct category of virtues; 
he defines them as “good character traits of a citizen, such as tolerance, respect, 
and community mindedness” (2015: 38). Howard Curzer (2012) has offered a 
seminal sketch of civic virtue in Aristotelian terms, and Nancy Snow (2018) has 
proposed an account of hope as a democratic civic virtue.4 
A further—and decisive—boost to the discussion has been given in the 
last couple of years by two attempts to offer a detailed account of civic virtue and 
its components. The first is that of Peterson (2019), who does so in terms of 
civility. In his work, he defines civic virtues as “worthwhile traits of character 
necessary for and expressed within social and political associations . . . that 
enable citizens to participate well within their democratic community and which, 
in turn, enable communities to flourish” (9). A central character trait in this 
respect is political, as opposed to everyday, civility 5 —that is, the virtue 
concerning “how citizens encounter each other and exchange ideas and 
interests in the public sphere” (7) and whose scope is wide and includes all the 
 
4 For further discussion, see, for example, Brudney (2013), Hope (2013), Leontsini (2013), 
Snow (2020). 
5 Or, as Curzer has it, political and polite civility. 
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various social associations to which citizens belong. Peterson identifies two 
components of political civility. The first is civil conduct, which includes “the set 
of capacities and dispositions that enable citizens to engage with each other” 
(14), such as sharing interests, seeking to accommodate conflicting interests, 
being open-minded, and avoiding dogmatism. Civil conduct has a particular 
bond with deliberation, which entails participation in discursive and dialogic 
processes. Secondly, civility implies for Peterson mutual fellow-feeling and well-
wishing—that is, a “partnership between citizens who share a sense of mutual 
positive regard” (35). 
Along the same lines, Curren and Dorn (2018), in what is likely to be 
the most thorough and systematic account of Aristotelian civic virtue so far, 
define civic virtues as what “equips people to act well in the civic sphere.” They 
identify three parts of civic virtue. Civic intelligence has to do with the formation 
of good judgment and involves learning not only the basics of civic education but 
also how to conduct a serious inquiry and make use of it in public discussion—
that is, discussion with citizens who might well have diverging opinions (110–
11). Civic friendship is the moral component of civility and amounts to an 
attitude of good will one should display toward other members of one’s 
community. More precisely, it involves a “cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
disposition to affirm the value and act for the good of the members of one’s 
communities” (114). Finally, civic competence has to do with how the 
capabilities that allow citizens to take part in community-based projects that 
enhance one’s civic environment. 
As will become clear in the remainder of section 1, our proposal is in 
the spirit of the most recent neo-Aristotelian perspectives on civic virtues that 
we have briefly summarized here. Yet our account introduces two main novel 
elements to the current discussion. First, in §§1.2-1.3 we sketch a notion of 
civility directly from Aristotle’s account of civic friendship and illustrate how a 
minimal restyling suffices to tailor his original view to the needs of citizens in 
our current society. Second, in §1.4 we expand on the deliberative or epistemic 
dimension of civility—that is, something similar to what Curren and Dorn (2018) 
call civic intelligence—and unpack it into distinct and trainable components. 
This analysis is extremely helpful for the argument of section 2, in that it allows 
us to show how the communicative environment typical of the post-truth age 
impairs our ability to cultivate civil attitudes by undermining the civic-epistemic 
components of civility. 
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1.2 Back to Aristotle 
 
Let us build our account of civility on its bedrock and look back at Aristotle’s 
insights into civic friendship. The place to begin is the discussion of friendship, 
which extends throughout books VIII and IX of Nicomachean Ethics. There, 
and in the Politics, among the forms of friendship based on utility, Aristotle lists 
the noble bond of politike philia, or civic friendship. He defines civic friendship 
as the basis of society, since “philia is the pursuit of a common social life” 
(Pol 1280b38–39), and claims it to be even more important than justice since it 
generates concord in the city (NE 1155b21–27): “In all communities of 
exchange, this sort of justice holds people together” (NE 1132b31), and 
“reciprocity preserves cities” (Pol 1261a32). 6  Friendship between fellow 
citizens, although grounded on the search for utility, is of the highest 
importance, for it contributes to the unity of both state and community by 
transmitting feelings of solidarity. Unlike other forms of unintimate relations, 
civic friendship can bring together many people who are not intimate with each 
other without degenerating into mutual exploitation or mere flattery: “Those 
who have many friends, and greet everyone in an intimate fashion, are thought 
to be friends of nobody, except in the way that fellow-citizens are friends; in fact, 
people call them obsequious [areskous]. Merely as a citizen, then, one can be a 
friend to many” (NE 1171a 16–19). 
Within a political community, sharing the same institutions and values 
is a sufficient condition for benevolence toward fellow citizens to occur. The 
kind of mutual concern and well-wishing that in intimate friendship springs from 
affection and a shared life is in the unique case of civic friendship supplied by the 
shared values of the polis, which is itself a kind of (extended) common life in 
which citizens are concerned about each other’s moral goodness. Sharing in the 
values of the polis allows therefore an extension of practical reason and concern: 
“A fellow citizen may not be a virtuous person, and therefore may not be another 
self in the way one virtuous person is for another. Nor does the virtuous person 
share his life with a mere fellow-citizen to the extent he shares it with a virtuous 
friend. But if the fellow-citizen is virtuous enough to share some similar aims, 
the virtuous person can extend his practical reason in the same way as with a 
virtuous friend” (Irwin 1990, 399). 
 
6 An extensive discussion of politike philia can be found in Eudemian Ethics, Book 7. For more 
on Aristotle and civic friendship, see, e.g., Cooper 1977, 1990; Fortenbaugh 1975; Walker 
1979. 
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Although civic friendship, being a form of relation, cannot itself be a 
virtue, we claim that it is the background condition of two virtues not mentioned 
in the treatise on friendship but discussed in a rather neglected section of 
Nicomachean Ethics. There Aristotle enumerates several nameless social 
virtues, which have long been seen as merely regulating manners and polite 
social exchanges; however, if correctly seen against the background of civic 
friendship, their deep political value emerges. The first is friendliness (NE IV, 
1126b 10 a 1127a 12), which, together with good will (NE 1166b 30 ff.), is 
described as friendly behavior, springing from concern for others’ well-being, 
and friendly feeling, directed at people we do not know and without their being 
aware of it. Clearly enough, having a virtuous disposition toward people we do 
not know intimately, friendliness and good will are the most suitable candidates 
for filling the emotional gap between fellow citizens and providing that kind of 
mutual concern that is said to be essential to civic friendship. The second 
virtuous trait is concord (NE 1167a 22 ff.). Again, concord is said to be 
“something friendly,” but rather than being an emotional bond it obtains when 
fellow citizens agree on deeply important matters and choose and put into 
practice the things they have judged rightly together. Thus, it implies a common 
deliberation over matters of common interest. 
In sum, there are two virtuous social dispositions, closely linked with 
civic friendship to the point of being mutually dependent on it. One of them 
implies mutual concern and benevolence among fellow citizens, the other a 
willingness to engage in common deliberation on matters of deep political 
importance. In light of their striking relevance to the common life of the polis, 
we suggest that, rather than social, they would be better labeled as civic virtues. 
In the next section, we redefine these two civic virtues as components of civility 
and attempt to provide a comprehensive account that builds on Aristotle’s 
remarks and fills in the gaps in his view of civic friendship. We focus on the latter 
component, which we call civil deliberation, and attempt to explain what kind of 
conduct we should expect from citizens who care that the polis deliberate well in 
matters of common interest. 
 
1.3 Aristotelian Civility Today 
 
Before outlining our account of civility, one brief remark about the scope of this 
project is in order. One might legitimately worry that reconstructing an 
Aristotelian view of civility is hopeless because our social and political 
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environment has nothing to do with the polis Aristotle had in mind when 
thinking about civic friendship.7 We are well aware that the time of the polis is 
over. Yet we are confident that an Aristotelian analysis can still offer illuminating 
insights, for at least three main reasons. For starters, the two virtues identified 
by Aristotle do not fit a specific political form only, since they name attitudes 
whose main background condition is the willingness to pursue the general aims 
of the political community. Paul Ludwig’s recent work is precisely an attempt to 
defend the idea that even we, in our modern society, need to restore an 
Aristotelian concept of civic friendship, for in practice–despite apparently 
contrary evidence–such a concept is already in place as a tendency to favor one’s 
fellow-citizens based on a shared love of a common regime or political system 
(Ludwig 2020: 2). It is, in his words, a “descriptive feature of liberalism” 
(Ludwig 2020: 6). 
Secondly, just as in the rather homogeneous Aristotelian polis, 
heterogeneous societies such as ours need stability; and this, in turn, depends 
on a bond among citizens that can only be a friendship in a very specific sense.8 
That is, it is a friendship that does not imply intimacy or proper affection and is 
pursued in the name of a certain kind of utility: the pursuit and achievement of 
the flourishing of the political community. Nothing more than this is required 
for civic friendship and the two related components of civility to obtain. Of 
course, the political goods we commonly share nowadays are extremely different 
from Aristotle’s since we cannot count on shared common interests, given the 
diversity among our societies. However, we still need civic friendship and civility 
in order to treat others and be treated with respect as equal participants to 
democratic life, to engage in productive discussions, to trust other members of 
the community, to hear their arguments open-mindedly, and to offer our own 
views in good faith and with honesty. 
Third, it looks as though we do appear to be living in a polis: a digital 
polis. This label is meant to capture two main aspects of our social environment. 
First—like the ancient Greeks—we constantly interact with people we barely 
know, and we can contribute to a deliberation that has significant consequences 
 
7 In particular, what has faded is a shared concept of paideia, anchored to well-identified ethical 
values. However, as we are suggesting here, this should not prevent us from drawing insights that, 
with important adjustments, can still prove fertile today. This conviction is shared, among others, 
by Ludwig (2020) in his recent important volume on Aristotelian civic friendship in the 
contemporary context. 
8 On this point, see Peterson (2019, 38–43). 
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for the welfare of the entire community. We are referring to what Habermas 
would call the “weak political sphere”—that is, the realm of interactions 
concerning matters of common importance that take place among citizens (that 
is, outside institutional settings and the halls of power). Second, these 
interactions are increasingly taking place in online environments—primarily, 
social media—as we shall see in section 2. 
 For these reasons, in the remainder of this paper we try to motivate the 
thesis that an Aristotelian account of civility is no less important in the context 
of the digital polis than it was at the time of the ancient Greeks. As a key step in 
the argument, let us now translate into more contemporary terms the 
Aristotelian suggestion that civic friendship requires and implies friendliness 
(with good will) and concord. We propose to define civility as the virtue of fellow 
citizens who treat each other as civic friends—that is, citizens who display civic 
benevolence and exercise civil deliberation. While the former represents the 
moral component of civility, the latter is epistemic in nature. 
As the heir to Aristotelian friendliness, civic benevolence implies good 
will and concern for the well-being of fellow citizens, motivated by the very fact 
of being part of a community. Being a virtue, as opposed to a natural trait, it is 
not a spontaneous feeling, but rather a trainable disposition that needs 
cultivation and can be threatened by many factors. As for civil deliberation, we 
conceive of it as more than a virtue related to the good exercise of one’s right to 
vote; it is the broader virtue of giving and receiving reasons within the public 
sphere in all the contexts in which an exchange of views on matters of common 
interest is at stake, be it the workplace, a discussion with fellow citizens, or a 
more formal setting such as the internal debates of an association or political 
party. Civil deliberation, of course, does not follow political partisanship in 
requiring that citizens share similar or identical opinions about any civic or 
political matter. Rather, it amounts to a regulative democratic ideal: forming a 
common view about key matters for the life of their community (that is, about 
matters of interest for all members of the community). 
In the proposed framework, civic benevolence and civil deliberation, 
despite being distinct components of civility, cannot stand without one another. 
The existence of benevolence among fellow citizens supplements civil 
deliberation with its goal and its very raison d’être, and in turn the exercise of 
civil deliberation fosters and strengthens benevolence. On the dark side, this 
means that any threat to either component endangers the other indirectly. The 
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following figure summarizes our account of the relationships among the 
concepts mentioned so far. 
 
We believe that in present times, the component that is most jeopardized by the 
communicative dynamics of the post-truth world is our capacity to deliberate 
with fellow citizens. These days, the wound to civility as civic friendship is 
opened via its epistemic side; if not healed, it is most likely to widen and to infect 
the quality of the moral bond among citizens. This is why, in what follows, 
despite being fully aware that civic benevolence is equally fundamental to the 
formation of civil behavior and deserves a separate investigation, we focus on 
supplementing this picture with a deeper understanding of civil deliberation. A 
detailed inquiry into this component is particularly needed because, as will 
become clear in section 2, developing this virtue is key to addressing some 
fundamental problems that affect the communicative dynamics typical of the 
digital polis. 
 
1.4 Civil Deliberation and Its Components 
 
How can we think of civil deliberation today, if we want to preserve the 
Aristotelian spirit yet be cognizant of the features of a democratic society? As 
the heir of Aristotelian concord, civil deliberation is a form of common inquiry—
that is, the intellectual activity of reasoning in common on practical matters.9 It 
should now become more evident why we think of civil deliberation as a civic-
epistemic virtue. For one thing, it belongs to our civic character because it has 
to do with our agency qua citizens or members of the digital polis. For another, 
it is epistemic in spirit because it makes us better citizens by helping us become 
good deliberators or inquirers. 
Civil deliberation as a civic-epistemic virtue can be unpacked into three 
different components (motivational, inquiry-related, and ethical), each 
 
9 “All deliberation is inquiry” (NE III, 3, 1112 b20); “in deliberating, either well or badly, we 
inquire for something and rationally calculate about it” (NE VI, 9, 1142, b13–15). 
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perfected by a distinct subvirtue. In general, on our account, being a civil 
deliberator is a complex activity that requires displaying the appropriate 
motivation when engaging in mutual inquiry with other fellow citizens, engaging 
in various deliberative procedures aimed at collecting relevant information and 
making informed judgments on matters of civic interest, and displaying the 
appropriate awareness toward the ethical implications of one’s actions in the 
context of joint decision-making processes. Let us analyze these components in 
more detail. 
The motivational component concerns the specific motivation for 
engaging in deliberation in the first place. A citizen who has such motivation 
displays the virtue of civic engagement. This virtue implies being aptly disposed 
to take part in the community’s deliberation and undertaking the actions 
required to promote civic benevolence while remaining focused throughout the 
deliberation. We can conceive of civic passion as a mean between two opposite 
vices. A vice of deficiency—call it civic insouciance—is typical of those who 
systematically remain silent, never engaging in discussion for fear of being 
targeted as enemies by acquaintances or colleagues. And a vice of excess—call it 
civic irascibility—affects those who are systematically prone to getting unduly 
angry about issues of civic import. 
The inquiry-related component of civil deliberation amounts to what 
we call deliberative conscientiousness. This virtue helps citizens translate their 
civic passion into virtuous deliberating procedures by coordinating the 
interactions between the epistemic dimension and the civic dimension of their 
inquiries. These interactions involve at least two directions. One goes from the 
civic to the epistemic and amounts to choosing and managing the inquiring 
procedures necessary to address a civic issue—from selecting information 
sources to proving willing and able to revise one’s opinion on civically relevant 
matters when exposed to counterevidence or in the face of disagreement with 
fellow citizens. The other direction goes from the epistemic to the civic and 
amounts to acknowledging that the overarching goal of these deliberative 
procedures is to ensure that a community make the best possible practical 
decisions for promoting the well-being of its members based on the available 
epistemic resources. 
Presumably, if they are not to work to the detriment of a community’s 
epistemic welfare, some of these decisions have to be made in uncertain 
epistemic conditions (for example, with limited knowledge of the issue at stake 
or widespread disagreement about how to address it). Deliberative 
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conscientiousness provides citizens with an awareness that civic matters have to 
be grounded in epistemically considerate inquiries but cannot be hostage to 
epistemic goals. Thus, this virtue allows citizens to make their intellectual 
virtues work for the relevant civic goal and achieve such goals even when the 
situation doesn’t allow them to meet ancillary epistemic goals. 
Deliberative conscientiousness can be conceived of as the virtuous 
mean between two main vices: deliberative negligence and deliberative paralysis. 
Deliberative negligence is the vice of those who culpably fail to acknowledge that 
the success of civil deliberation rests on epistemically well-founded inquiries. 
One can be blamed for this failing to the extent that one is systematically 
unwilling to recognize that one indulges in bad reasoning (and unwilling to 
recognize that this is detrimental to one’s civic participation) and to revise one’s 
attitudes. In this respect, deliberative negligence is perfectly compatible with 
civic passion, as a citizen might well be interested in—even passionate about—
the well-being of her community but fail to acknowledge that her judgments 
about some ethnical minorities in her community are biased. 
Deliberative paralysis stands at the opposite side of the spectrum, as it 
is the vice of those who are unable to make any practical decision about some 
civic matter unless that decision is based on rock-solid epistemic grounds. 
Specifically, deliberative paralysis is the condition affecting those agents who 
have already secured important epistemic achievements but have to deliberate 
based on partial knowledge only. Deliberative paralysis can be considered as a 
vice to the extent that epistemic agents are responsible for failing to reach a 
decision in the context of a deliberative process. That is, it becomes a vice when 
they consciously—but unjustifiedly—postpone the deliberative stage of their 
inquiries in the hopes of collecting a conclusive body of evidence or knowledge 
and deliberating on rock-solid epistemic grounds. 
Finally, conversational responsibility is the subvirtue related to the 
ethical component of civil deliberation; its goal is to ensure that citizens debate 
in a way that promotes civic benevolence. For one thing, this virtue helps one 
acknowledge that fellow citizens are owed mutual respect qua members of the 
community and prima facie credibility qua epistemic agents. For another, 
responsible discussion makes one aware of what taking a public stance on a 
subject implies both for accountability for what one asserts and for the influence 
that one’s opinion might have on other community members. As a consequence, 
responsible discussion also requires that one engage in discussion by offering 
arguments and reasons in support of one’s stance. Failing to do so amounts to a 
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lack of respect for the deliberative capacities of one’s interlocutors and worsens 
the quality of public deliberation. 
Responsible discussion allows its possessor to avoid two vicious 
extremes: on the one hand, a vice of deficiency—call it conversational 
carelessness—typical of those who underestimate the effects of their behavior in 
public debate and demonstrate no respect for fellow citizens and their opinion 
in deliberation; on the other, a vice of excess—call it conversational 
hypersensitivity—typical of those who overestimate the impact of their actions in 
public debate as a result of a disproportionately high sense of responsibility for 
what they assert and how they behave in public. 
The following table summarizes the components, subvirtues, and 
corresponding subvices of civil deliberation. 
 
 
The proposed account of civil deliberation makes no presumption of exclusivity 
as a way of cashing out the interplay of civic and epistemic aspects of our 
deliberation with fellow citizens. Yet this characterization should suffice as a 
general framework for understanding the deliberative dimension of civility. The 
next section illustrates why our efforts to unpack the components of civil 
deliberation are particularly relevant in the context of a discussion about the 
post-truth condition and the available remedies for its detrimental features. 
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2. Civic Virtues in the Post-Truth Age: How the Spread of Misinformation 
Threatens Civil Deliberation 
In the opening section, we anticipated that one reason why we should be worried 
about the developments of the post-truth age is that they obstruct our capacity 
to cultivate the virtue of civility and, in particular, they impair our capacity for 
civil deliberation. In this section, we illustrate this problem and its detrimental 
effects by showing how the post-truth condition threatens each dimension of our 
deliberation with fellow citizens. 
Before doing so, a few remarks are in order. First, a clarification about 
the notion of a post-truth condition and its link with the environment we are 
interested in—namely, the digital polis: The post-truth condition is commonly 
taken to signify a culture that has radically transformed the relationship between 
human beings and truth in social, political, and scientific domains. In particular, 
as Fuller (2018) notes, the post-truth condition “democratizes” truth and 
falsehood in the attempt to transform the public sphere—that is, our social and 
political lives. Typical problems posed by the post-truth condition involve the 
proliferation of fake news and alternative facts (which this section focuses on), 
widespread disregard and disrespect for epistemic authority, and the 
opportunity for entire communities to manipulate information as they wish.10 
Unsurprisingly, the digital polis constitutes the ideal environment for the post-
truth condition to develop. The fact that social networks, blogs, and forums are 
increasingly taking the place of traditional mass media as platforms for gathering 
and distributing information means that their users have unprecedented 
power.11 In particular, it gives us a chance to make our voices heard and an 
opportunity to cultivate our convictions and values along with other people who 
share them. 
Second, a couple of methodological points: The spread of fake news 
and misinformation is widely regarded as a disease for which we urgently need 
therapy (Lazer et al. 2018). Our work contributes to what have been called 
educational therapies (Croce and Piazza 2021a)—that is, approaches aimed at 
 
10 The term ‘post-truth’ as well as the notion of the ‘post-truth condition’ are still widely discussed 
among philosophers, not to mention scholars of other disciplines. For detailed investigations see, 
among others, Ferrari and Moruzzi (2020), Ferraris (2017), Fuller (2018), and Maddalena and 
Gili (2017). 
11 For a comprehensive analysis of how information and communication technologies affect our 
interaction with the world and the acquisition and distribution of information, see, e.g., Floridi 
(2014).  
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counteracting this phenomenon via reforming or improving citizens’ online 
agency. 12  One important limitation of the current philosophical discussions 
about extant educational therapies is that they appear to restrict their focus to 
our epistemic conduct. Such an approach overlooks at least two decisive factors. 
First, fake-news consumption is motivated not only by epistemic concerns 
(namely, the fact that a consumer takes a piece of misinformation to be true) but 
also by non-epistemic interests, such as the need to reinforce one’s social 
identity within a community and protect one’s own community from external 
pressures or straightforward attacks by rival groups (Croce and Piazza 2021b). 
Second and relatedly, we deploy social networks not only passively to acquire 
information about the world but also actively to discuss matters of common 
interest with other members of our communities. 
These methodological remarks illustrate why placing online inquiries 
and public debate in the context of a reform of our civic conduct could provide 
the appropriate framework for designing educational approaches. For it allows 
us to explain that the motivational grounds underlying attempts to promote 
internet literacy, critical thinking, and intellectual virtues should primarily 
concern not how to make us better thinkers or reasoners per se but rather how 
we can make the digital polis a more just and equal environment to inhabit. 
The scenario we have briefly sketched should make it sufficiently clear 
why we think that civic traits of character deserve more attention in the 
discussion of remedies for the post-truth condition. In the remainder of this 
section, we shall account for the need to cultivate civility—in particular, civil 
deliberation—by investigating how the spread of misinformation threatens the 
motivational, inquiry-related, and ethical dimensions of our deliberation with 
fellow citizens. In other words, we aim at showing that the problematic 
complexity of the communicative dynamics in the digital polis motivates reform 
of citizens’ deliberative conduct. 
Let us begin our analysis of the problems posed by the spread of 
misinformation by investigating why citizens of the digital polis are failing from 
a motivational standpoint. One obvious reason is that the excessive amount of 
information to which we are exposed interferes with our disposition to actively 
 
12 Typical examples of these therapies include strategies to strengthen citizens’ internet-literacy 
skills (Lewandowsky et al. 2012) or cultivate intellectual virtues (Heersmink 2018; Kotsonis 
2020; Smart 2018) with the goals of limiting the effect of cognitive biases and helping users assess 
the epistemic quality of the information they consume.  
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participate in the community’s deliberative processes. To get a feel for the 
magnitude of this problem, consider that every minute more than 300,000 
status updates and almost 60,000 links are shared on Facebook 
(OmnicoreAgency.com 2019), around 350,000 new posts are tweeted on 
Twitter (Mention 2018), and 500 hours of new video content are uploaded to 
YouTube (Statista.com 2019). Clearly, no matter how passionate we are about 
civic matters and public debate, forming an informed opinion requires that we 
engage in time-consuming activities and this demotivates us to engage in the 
community’s deliberation processes. 
Remaining focused on the motives for our participation in public 
deliberation is by no means easier, since we only have a limited span of attention. 
As Gausby (2015) has recently shown, the younger generations have a reduced 
capacity for sustained attention—more specifically, the capacity to remain 
focused on the task one is working on till one completes it—for which they 
compensate with a capacity for multitasking. At first glance, this might sound 
like reassuring news. On closer inspection, it is far from being so because when 
we are multitasking today, the average level of selective attention we devote to 
digital content is 50 percent lower than fifteen years ago. This means that our 
capacity for multitasking works at the expense of our capacity to discriminate 
relevant stimuli from irrelevant ones (see also Riva 2018, 117–18). As a 
consequence, it is highly plausible that our motivation to actively participate in 
the civic life of our community drowns in the ocean of information to which we 
are exposed in the digital polis. 
As anticipated above, similar considerations apply to the inquiry-
related dimension of deliberation. Here the problem lies in the activities and the 
procedures through which we reach an informed opinion on matters of civic 
interest and, more specifically, in our cognitive limitations. One important 
reason why we struggle to make epistemically appropriate decisions is that we 
are prone to cognitive biases and social media are structured in such a way as to 
amplify the effects of these biases. 
An in-depth consideration of these aspects would require a separate 
project; here we shall concentrate our attention on a selected range of biases and 
briefly explain their impact on our inquiries on social media. The first cognitive 
limitations that we shall mention have to do with how we handle cognitive 
dissonance, namely an experience of conflict between cognitive states alerting 
us that our desire to know and understand the world around us is not aligned 
with our evidence. Confirmation bias attempts to reduce cognitive dissonance 
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by making us prone to looking out for information that confirms or supports our 
pre-existing beliefs and to disregarding information that clashes with them 
(Nickerson 1998; Wason 1960). Instead, motivated reasoning reduces 
cognitive dissonance by obstructing our ability to take into consideration 
evidence against our beliefs. In particular, this bias leads us to accept evidence 
supporting our convictions uncritically while readily dismissing evidence that 
goes against them (Kunda 1990).  
Recent research by Dan Kahan (2016) shows that this particular form 
of reasoning is often prompted by an ideological or political conviction that 
motivates our biased appraisal of the available evidence. Inevitably, the fact that 
our political opinions influence how we assess the evidence has a negative effect 
on the inquiry-related stages of our deliberative processes. This effect is further 
amplified by the architecture of social media platforms, which take advantage of 
these cognitive biases to ensure that users spend time on them. Typically, they 
do so through their algorithms, which filter content in such a way that users are 
exposed to information that falls in line with their views on political, social, and 
moral issues (Bozdag 2013; Nichols 2017; Pariser 2013). 
Our discussion has so far focused on the effects that these biases have 
on individual users.13 It should come as no surprise that the way in which social 
networks trigger our cognitive limitations can easily pollute the entire 
information environment of the digital polis because it fosters large-scale 
phenomena such as group polarization. As Sunstein notes (2002), group 
polarization is the tendency of a group to display more extreme attitudes and 
beliefs than the ones its members possess when taken as individual agents. By 
exposing users to sources and individuals that have similar takes on social, 
political, and cultural issues, social networks favor the formation of like-minded 
groups or tribes that lead their members to reinforce their convictions and 
radicalize their views. Group polarization constitutes a problem for the inquiry-
related component of civil deliberation because it nurtures epistemically 
unjustified belief radicalization. Furthermore, it should be considered as a 
 
13  Further cognitive biases that obstruct the inquiry-related dimension of civil deliberation 
include memory-based mechanisms and fluency effects (Levy 2017). More specifically, memory-
based mechanisms impede our efforts to deliberate well by preventing us from recalling whether a 
piece of content comes from a reliable—as opposed to an unreliable—source (Lewandowsky et al. 
2012). Fluency effects encroach on our mnemonic system too but do so via repeated exposure to 
a given content, which leads us to forget its source (Weaver et al. 2007) or, in its most 
troublesome version—which psychologists call ‘the truth effect’ (Fazio et al. 2015)—to take a piece 
a false information to be true. 
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fierce enemy of civility and civil deliberation in general, as it fosters a 
fragmentation of the society that hinders any attempt to make diverse citizens 
collaborate with each other for the common good of the community (Sunstein 
2009).14 
Despite its incompleteness, the scenario we have just sketched should 
suffice to show how difficult it is for a citizen of the digital polis to reach an 
informed opinion and engage in epistemically considerate deliberations with 
fellow citizens on matters of common interest. It is now time to consider some 
ethical aspects of the current dynamics of public deliberation that post-truth 
communication severely obstructs. In particular, we focus on the problems 
affecting our online behavior qua citizens of a digital polis engaged in collective 
deliberation, typically via social networks. The overarching ethical problem is 
that social media users seem to be unaware of or to underestimate the 
consequences of their online conduct. This problem can easily be split into two 
issues, one normative and one social. 
Regarding the former aspect, the most evident limitation is that we 
appear to lack stable norms regulating our online behavior. For example, it is 
controversial whether sharing content—including reposting or retweeting—on 
social media amounts to endorsing the content (Rini 2017; Lazer et al. 2018). 
In the extreme cases, retweeting or liking content shared by other users can 
make one liable to defamation lawsuits. (This has recently been the case in such 
countries as India, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and South Africa; see 
Klaris and Bedat 2018.) We need not enter into the details of this issue here. 
Suffice it to say that, on the one hand, it might seem intuitive to treat those who 
share content as if they endorsed it (Marsili 2020). On the other hand, we might 
still want to ensure that social media users are free to share content just because 
they find it interesting, amusing, or curious without necessarily endorsing its 
truth. 
Though we might be excused for the mistakes we make that stem from 
the instability of the norms governing content-sharing on social media, we 
surely cannot be excused for engaging in hostile interactions with other users 
and in hate speech (O’Regan 2018). Patton et al. (2014) have recently found that 
this social problem often originates from the anonymity that comes with online 
 
14 Among other factors that contribute to the fragmentation of the society are socio-epistemic 
structures like epistemic bubbles and echo chambers, which prevent entire groups of users from 
consuming specific kinds of information. For an in-depth discussion of these socio-epistemic 
structures, see Nguyen (2020). 
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activity on social media. Typically, aggressive, disrespectful, or even violent 
online behavior is fostered by the fact that violent users target socially distant 
victims—that is, someone with whom a user has no frequent physical contact—
and/or hide behind profiles that do not share their real names. Besides 
constituting enough of an ethical problem in itself, hostile online behavior and 
hate speech help to polarize and radicalize public debate and are therefore 
detrimental to both the ethical dimension of collective deliberation and the 
processes for reaching an informed opinion on issues of public interest.  
In sum, the problems just mentioned demonstrate that we lack the 
necessary awareness of the responsibility that comes with taking a public stance 
in a debate in the digital polis, let alone the capacity to discuss and deliberate 
with fellow citizens in a way that promotes civic friendship. 
It should be clear by now that the communication dynamics of the 
digital polis threaten all three dimensions of a successful inquiry. They interfere 
with our motivation to deliberate with fellow citizens, they trigger our cognitive 
limitations and hamper our procedures for forming informed opinions, and they 
make us prone to unethical conduct in online environments. However, we 
should not let this scenario frighten or discourage us too much. Though 
deliberating well with our fellow citizens is a difficult task for agents living in a 
post-truth age, our analysis has laid out a framework for understanding the 
various sides of the challenge and a rationale for the components that a remedial 
virtue should include. Far from constituting a checkmate against the post-truth 
condition, being aware of how this condition obstructs the formation of civic 
character surely constitutes a first and fundamental step toward learning how to 
deliberate well with our fellow citizens in the online environments we inhabit. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper inquired into the civic traits of our character with two general 
objectives: first, to offer an Aristotelian account of a central civic virtue, namely 
civility; second, to shed light on the relevance of a discussion on civic virtues in 
our present times and social settings. We achieved the former objective by 
showing how Aristotle’s insights into civic friendship can be actualized in a novel 
account of civility that is composed of two main subvirtues, namely civic 
benevolence and civil deliberation. We then concentrated our analysis on the 
latter virtue and distinguished three main components—motivational, epistemic, 
and ethical—as virtuous means between vicious extremes. Regarding the latter 
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objective, our detailed analysis of civil deliberation allowed us to illustrate how 
the spread of misinformation typical of our post-truth age impairs our ability to 
deliberate with fellow citizens on matters of civic interest. In particular, we 
showed that the communicative dynamics of the online environments we inhabit 
trigger our proneness to cognitive biases, rely on an infrastructure made to 
amplify the effects of such limitations, and favor the spread of online misconduct 
and hate speech because of the anonymity that often comes with online agency. 
 The scenario we have outlined does not make it easy to imagine how we 
can cultivate civically virtuous behavior in our communities. That was not our 
goal. Instead, we hope we have convinced the reader that civic virtues—in 
particular, civil deliberation—ought to play a more central role in the study of our 
character, particularly because in the digital polis we need them more than ever. 
The sooner we realize the urgency of the problem, the faster we’ll learn how to 
contain the detrimental effects of the post-truth condition. 
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